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1. The neoclassical position 
 
 
The dominant neoclassical approach to economic theory tends to be rather sparse on 
the question of profits. This is not surprising given the neoclassical emphasis on 
perfect competition and equilibrium. Under perfect competition, equilibrium implies 
that revenues are exactly equal to costs and, therefore, profits are absent. To be sure, 
the proper estimation of costs includes a magnitude of “normal” profits – these being 
defined as the minimum necessary profits for firms to remain in operation. The 
normal rate of profit is seen as the absolutely essential minimum compensation for 
enterprise and risk-taking, without which the owners of capital would rather be 
rentiers than continue in business. Normal profits are, therefore, part of the costs of 
production; they must be earned for firms to properly cover their costs and the level of 
production to be in equilibrium.  
 
Outside of equilibrium, “abnormal” profits or, in other words, revenues exceeding 
properly computed costs of production are quite possible. Abnormal profits arise 
exactly because a perfectly competitive economy is outside equilibrium and constitute 
the motivating force for the re-establishment of equilibrium. Abnormal profits 
motivate firms to expand production and are self-liquidating, as they bring about a 
new equilibrium at a higher level of output. 
 
It is clear that in perfectly competitive markets abnormal profits play a positive role: 
they signify the existence of unfulfilled demand and motivate an increase in 
production. Moreover, abnormal profits are a temporary, transitional phenomenon 
which competitive forces are certain to eliminate. It follows that abnormal profits far 
from posing a problem are, on the contrary, a sign of dynamism of a perfectly 
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competitive economy, as they invariably arise when the economy grows under the 
spur of innovations or some production factor influx 
There is, nevertheless, a different kind of abnormal profits with less benevolent 
characteristics. These profits are associated with monopoly and, more generally, with 
a weakening of competition. Any form of competition short of a perfectly competitive 
market, may give rise to abnormal profits. 
 
But the absence of perfect competition does not inevitably give rise to abnormal 
profits. The Harvard economist, Edward Chamberlin1, has argued that intense rivalry 
among firms can lead to an elimination of abnormal profits even in the absence of 
perfect competition. Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition model requires that the 
number of competing firms producing slightly different products is large enough, so 
that each firm can ignore the consequences of its actions on others. Moreover, there 
must be no barriers to entry of new competitors. Under these conditions, abnormal 
profits are driven to zero in equilibrium exactly like under perfect competition. They 
are thus, once more, a temporary phenomenon which competition is certain to 
eliminate in the transition to equilibrium. 
 
The only difference between Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition and perfect 
competition is that equilibrium in the former implies price and average cost being 
equal at a level exceeding marginal cost and minimum average cost. Consequently, 
less is produced at a higher price in comparison to perfect competition. Does this 
mean that the departure from perfect competition even in the absence of abnormal 
profits leads necessarily to a socially inferior outcome? It would seem so, since 
production is carried out with excess capacity and plant is not used as efficiently as 
engineering specifications permit. The inefficiency charge is, nevertheless, disputed 
on the basis of the benefit afforded by the greater variety in products which is 
available under monopolistic competition. Variety is valued and since it can only be 
obtained at a greater cost, a higher price does not necessarily denote inefficiency.2 
 
                                                
1 Chamberlin, E. H. (1933) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press). 
2 “People value variety, and are willing to pay a higher price to obtain it. Thus, the fact that goods are 
sold at a price above the minimum average cost does not necessarily mean that the economy is 
inefficient.” Stiglitz J. E. (1993) Economics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2nd ed.), p. 357. 
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Leaving aside Chamberlin’s monopolistic competition, does the abandonment of 
perfect competition imply abnormal profits? This seems generally to be the case when 
firm rivalry weakens. The existence of abnormal profits means that output is lower 
and price is higher than they need to be (and certainly than they would be under 
perfect competition). Buyers pay more for a product than the marginal cost to produce 
it. Abnormal profits arise from the weakness of competition and tend to be a 
permanent rather than a transient feature of weakly competitive markets. 
 
This kind of abnormal profits, arising from weak competition, is sharply distinguished 
from out-of-equilibrium, temporary profits of both perfect and monopolistic 
competition. Persistent abnormal profits have no obvious social justification and 
liberal political philosophy has consistently and vigorously opposed them. Anti-
monopoly legislation and policies to protect and enhance competition are rooted in the 
writings of Adam Smith and the classical political economists of the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Following this joint tradition of classical political economy and 
political liberalism, persistent abnormal profits are prima facie suspect of being 
socially injurious and the onus is on those making them to justify their existence. 
 
A noteworthy attempt at wholesale justification of persistent abnormal profits was 
made by another Harvard professor, the famous Austrian economist Joseph 
Schumpeter. For him, markets are nearly always out of equilibrium. Markets are 
perpetually in flux as a result of innovations brought about by technological progress 
and entrepreneurial activity. Innovative activity is the mainspring of economic 
progress, which is intimately associated with the creative destruction not only of 
equilibrium but of any settled and stable economic practice. It follows that abnormal 
profits are generally an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon and their seeming persistence 
is illusory: they are rather the result of the ubiquity of successive disequilibria. This is 
supported by the empirical observation that abnormal profits are rarely invariant and 
though persistent they tend to fluctuate widely.  
 
If it is accepted, following Schumpeter, that all abnormal profits are out-of-
equilibrium phenomena, is there a difference between those which arise in perfectly 
competitive markets from those which appear in imperfectly competitive ones? Are 
the latter less socially justified than the former? Is monopoly or imperfect competition 
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socially inferior to perfect competition? The answer to all these is not clearcut any 
more. It all hinges on which abnormal profits and which market characteristics are 
more conducive to innovation and economic progress. If abnormal profits in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets lead to a greater R&D effort and more 
innovation, then this may more than offset the disadvantage of the monopoly’s higher 
price and lower output. It may, in fact, be argued that this is indeed the case, as the 
many small firms in perfectly competitive markets are as a rule short of funds to 
finance R&D. Moreover, any innovation in a perfectly competitive world may easily 
be imitated by competitors, thus eroding any advantage to be had from an effort to 
innovate. 
 
In conclusion, Schumpeter’s analysis manages to take the stigma off persistent 
abnormal profits and imperfectly competitive markets. To be sure, monopolies and 
oligopolies may well be abusing their dominance and earn abnormal profits without 
promoting innovation and even by impeding it. But there is no presumption that their 
persistently abnormal profits are necessarily unjustifiable. The abnormal profits may 
be a justified price to pay for greater innovation and, consequently, every case needs 
to be considered on its own merit.  
 
What is the conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey of the neoclassical stance 
on profits? It would seem that it does not amount to a penetrating analysis of the 
nature and the determinants of profits. The basic distinction between normal and 
abnormal profits serves to separate the kind of profits which is generally 
unobjectionable from that which may be controversial and socially objectionable. But 
the separation is not watertight and abnormal profits, even if they persist in 
imperfectly competitive markets and despite the traditional liberal view of classical 
political economy, may not be presumed to oppose necessarily the social interest. In 
addition, it should be clear that the distinction between normal and abnormal profits is 
not empirically operational. There is no way of empirically estimating normal profits 
and no empirical data correspond to either one of the two concepts (though empirical 
data may approximate their sum total). 
 
There are certain important questions that the neoclassical approach does not address 
at all. What determines the volume of profits in an economy? Neoclassical theory is 
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silent on this question. Schumpeter provides an interesting hint: innovations and the 
consequent growth of the economy. But he is suggestive rather than analytical and, in 
any case, Schumpeter doesn’t quite fit in the neoclassical theoretical approach. What 
is the nature of profits? What is the product counterpart of monetary profits? Or, to 
put it differently, what products correspond to profits (which are expressed in money 
terms)? Neoclassical theory is equally silent on these and it is to these questions that 
we will now turn. Michal Kalecki’s analysis provides the direction and guides the 
remainder of this paper. 
 
 
2. The  Kaleckian  approach 
 
 
The determinants of profits, following Kalecki’s analysis, can easily be derived from 
national accounting identities3. Gross profits net of taxes (P) must be equal to gross 
private investment (I), plus export surplus (X), plus budget deficit (B), plus 
consumption out of profits (C), minus savings out of wages (S).  
 
P = I + X + B + C – S 
 
This approach shows that profits are determined by decisions, actions and outcomes 
relating to and ultimately determining the magnitude of five macroeconomic 
variables. Let us consider these in turn. 
 
2.1  Private investment 
  
Private investment is decided and carried out mostly by firms. To the extent that they 
are financed by loans, the availability of finance and the relevant rate of interest may 
be decisive influences on the determination of the investment magnitude. But the role 
of the banking sector and the terms at which it lends are often less important than the 
psychological state of the business class. The business climate is crucial in 
determining the perception of risk and the investors’ expectations and confidence in 
                                                
3 Kalecki shows that they may also be derived from the Marxian “schemes of reproduction” by 
dividing the economy into three departments: department 1 producing investment goods, department 2 
producing consumption goods for capitalists and department 3 producing consumption goods for 
workers. See Kalecki M. (1971) Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-
1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 7. 
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initiating an investment project. Thus, the variability of business confidence and 
animal spirits has an impact on investment plans which is often considerably greater 
than that of interest rates and borrowing terms. In any case, there can be little doubt 
that the animal spirits of business decision-makers in conjunction with the stance of 
the financial sector are the two main influences on the volume of investment. 
 
Investment and profits are interdependent but not in the way that it is commonly 
thought. Investment is carried out in order to make profits in the future. But present-
day profits do not determine investment; at most, they may facilitate its financing. In 
contrast, as Kalecki shows, investment is a determinant of present-day profits. Here, it 
is necessary to make two important distinctions. The first one is that expected profits 
(in the future) must be distinguished from actual (present-day) profits. It is then 
correct that expected profits determine investment. But actual profits are determined 
by investment. The second distinction is about the meaning of the verb “to determine” 
in the preceding two statements. Expected profits determine investment in the manner 
in which an independent variable in a functional relationship is said to determine the 
dependent one. The precise specification of the functional relationship may be open to 
argument and can be different from one context to another. But the functional 
relationship between actual profits and investment are precisely specified 
independently of context. Actual profits are determined by investment in the one-to-
one manner of an arithmetical relationship. Any change in investment unequivocally 
and always changes actual profits exactly by the same amount.  
 
The importance of investment as a determinant of profits can hardly be exaggerated. 
Of all five determinants, this is the only one that increases the productive capacity of 
the economy. It is also the one that provides the best social justification for the 
existence of profits. By increasing the productive capacity of the economy, 
investment expands the choice-set available to society and increases potential welfare. 
A larger productive capacity puts society in a better position to fulfill whatever goals 
are set by its citizens. Moreover, the socially useful activity of increasing productive 
capacity is one that may be carried on indefinitely, so long as business confidence 
does not falter. 
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The examination of a certain puzzle may be of help in making clear the importance of 
investment as a determinant of profits. Let us imagine a closed economy without a 
public sector consisting of a single giant firm. The single firm hires workers for a 
wage and carries out production at all stages from raw materials to final consumption 
and investment goods. Is profit possible in such a setting and what form will it take? 
 
The firm cannot get back as revenue more than it has paid in wages, so it would seem 
at first sight that it cannot make a profit in money terms. To be sure, if it gets back as 
revenue on the sale of consumption goods all it has paid in wages (for the production 
of both consumption and investment goods), it makes a profit on the sale of 
consumption goods. This is because the wages paid in the production of consumption 
goods are less than the total wages spent on the purchase of consumption goods. On 
the other hand, is there not an equal loss in money terms made in the production of 
investment goods? This is undeniably so and, therefore, no profit is made in money 
terms when both sectors are taken together. But the investment goods are the property 
of the firm and constitute part of its productive capacity. Thus, even though the firm 
cannot make a profit in money terms, it makes one in physical or real terms by 
keeping the goods produced by the investment sector for its own use. The profit in 
real terms is equal to the output of the investment goods sector. 
 
It must be noticed that the cost value of this output of investment goods, which is of 
course the wage-bill paid for their production, exactly equals the profit on the sale of 
consumption goods (if all wages are spent). The more workers are employed in the 
production of investment goods and the greater the investment sector’s wage-bill, the 
higher (and exactly equal to the wage-bill) are the profits made on the sale of 
consumption goods. 
 
It may be concluded that investment increases profit in real terms, by creating 
productive capacity owned by the firm, while increasing by an equal amount profit in 
money terms from the sale of consumption goods to the workers. The firm may 
continue indefinitely to invest and expand its productive capacity making in this way 
a profit in real terms. (The cost value of this is exactly equal to both the profit in 
money terms from the sale of consumption goods and the money loss in the 
production of investment goods). 
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If we leave the confines of a single giant firm, and admit a multitude of firms in both 
the consumption and investment sectors, the above result does not change to a 
significant extent. The only difference is that some profit is made in the investment 
sector. This depends on the total value of investment, consequent on the state of 
business confidence and the stance of the financial sector, in conjunction with the 
average profit margin, which is determined by the strength of competition 
characterizing the investment sector Consequently, a given value of investment is 
divided between profits of firms in the investment sector and profits of firms in the 
consumption sector (instead of being in its entirety profits in the consumption sector). 
Compared to the previous case of an economy consisting of a giant firm, a given 
value of investment implies a smaller wage-bill since not only the labor cost but 
profits also are now included in this value. This implies both a smaller output of 
investment goods and lower profits in the consumption sector. Given the lower 
production of investment goods, profits in terms of physical product are    lower and 
shared by all the firms that buy investment goods. Nevertheless, total profits of both 
sectors in money terms will be positive (instead of zero) and equal to the given value 
of investment.  
 
2.2  Export surplus 
 
An increase in exports increases profits by the same amount while an increase in 
imports reduces them correspondingly (assuming that the other variables in the profit 
equation remain unchanged). Focusing on exports, Kalecki explains the mechanism 
involved in the following way: “The value of an increment in the production of the 
export sector will be accounted for by the increase in profits and wages of that sector. 
The wages, however, will be spent on consumption goods. Thus, production of 
consumption goods for workers will be expanded up to the point where profits out of 
this production will increase by the amount of additional wages in the export sector”.4  
 
This multiplier effect is common to all the variables in the profit equation. The 
multiplier does not operate, of course, when the production of consumption goods for 
workers is at capacity level. In this case, “prices of these goods will rise up to a point 
                                                
4  Kalecki M., op. cit. pp. 84-85. 
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where profits out of this production will increase by the amount of additional wages in 
the export sector”.5 The value of the production or employment multiplier is in this 
case equal to zero. As long as capacity is available and production expands, the 
multiplier will be positive. It will be at its highest level if prices remain constant (or 
fall) but, in general, it will be moderated by a tendency of prices to rise with the 
increase in demand. Nevertheless, whatever the response of prices to the increase in 
demand and correspondingly the value of the employment or production multiplier, 
the rise in profits following an increase in exports is equal to the incremental export 
value.  
 
Imports affect profits in the opposite direction and exactly to the same extent. 
Demand lost to imports implies a corresponding reduction in profits and wages either 
in the investment or the consumption sectors, with a consequent reduction in spending 
out of wages further impacting negatively the production of consumption goods for 
workers. It is interesting that the production and employment multipliers, which are 
obviously negative, will tend to be greater in absolute terms than in the case of an 
export increase. The reason is that the fall in demand is likely to lead to lower prices 
and profit margins. As a consequence, the reduction in total profits, which must be 
equal to the initial increment in import value, is spread over a greater amount of 
production and employment. The loss of jobs, therefore, that is due to a deficit in the 
balance of trade is likely to be greater than the gain in employment due to an 
equivalent surplus in the trade balance. 
 
A trade deficit implies that profits, production and employment are transferred from 
the domestic economy to its trading partners. Indebtedness and sale of assets to 
foreigners rises by the same amount as the volume of profits which is lost to 
foreigners. Currency devaluation, import tariffs and other import obstacles, as well as 
export subsidies, are the policies used to eliminate a trade deficit and create a trade 
surplus. To the extent that these policies positively affect the trade balance, to the 
same extent they increase profits. 
 
                                                
5  Kalecki M., op. cit., first footnote on p. 85. 
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It should be noted that there is a strong link between mercantilism and profits. 
Mercantilism is the doctrine which prevailed for centuries and was vigorously 
attacked by Adam Smith. Mercantilism held that the wealth of a nation is measured 
by the amount of gold in its possession. In an age in which gold was the means of 
payment in international trade, the way for a nation to acquire and accumulate gold 
was by creating a trade surplus. But the creation of a trade surplus increases profits 
correspondingly. In conditions of unemployment and, especially, when there is an 
economic crisis, neo-mercantilist policies aiming at the creation of a trade surplus 
become very tempting exactly because this increases profits, as well as production 
and employment. 
 
It is clear that a trade surplus for one country implies an equal trade deficit for the rest 
of the world, so a boosting of profits and economic activity by means of mercantilist 
policies aiming at a trade surplus will correspondingly reduce profits and weaken 
economic activity abroad. It is, therefore, evident that mercantilist policies cannot be 
used universally to overcome an economic crisis. 
 
Despite the fact that a trade surplus has a “beggar thy neighbor” effect on trading 
partners by reducing their profits, there are some countries (such as Japan and 
Germany) with persistent trade surpluses, as there are others with persistent trade 
deficits. What are the effects of such persistent trade balance conditions and, in 
particular, is there a problem in having a persistent trade surplus? 
 
Let us examine first the persistent trade deficit. We have already seen that, in this 
case, there is a systematic transfer of profits, production and employment from the 
deficit country to its trading partners while indebtedness and sale of assets to creditors 
rises by the amount of profits lost to the trading partners. Is this necessarily a bad state 
of affairs? Not always. It depends on the reasons for the persistent trade deficit and, 
especially, on whether the trade deficit facilitates the growth in productive capacity. If 
the productive capacity is growing rapidly with no unemployment, the trade deficit 
does not present a problem. On the contrary, it may serve the cause of rapid growth in 
productive capacity by making possible the provision of necessary consumption 
goods produced more cheaply abroad and/or the provision of necessary intermediate 
and investment goods required for the domestic investment effort. Thus, the crucial 
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question regarding the trade deficit’s effect on the economy is whether or not the 
productive capacity is growing at a sufficiently fast pace and the extent to which the 
trade deficit supports the growth of the productive capacity. 
 
There is no doubt that a persistent trade deficit associated with high luxury 
consumption, high unemployment and low investment in productive capacity has a 
weakening effect on the economy. Even if GDP and profits grow while 
unemployment is kept low (which is possible with rising public and private 
consumption and diminishing savings), a persistent trade deficit associated with a 
more or less stagnant productive capacity is a drag on the economy and tends to 
further weaken it. Moreover, it is indicative of a misaligned and overvalued exchange 
rate resulting in a low international competitiveness of a country’s tradeable goods 
and services.  In these circumstances, and unlike the case in which the trade deficit 
supports rapid growth in productive capacity, a persistent trade deficit becomes 
unsustainable before long. The reason is that creditors are unwilling to extend credit 
when the growth in productive capacity does not keep pace with increasing 
indebtedness. Also, the purchase of assets by foreigners becomes less and less 
attractive as the threat of currency devaluation looms ever larger. Eventually, a 
stagnating productive capacity will inevitably result in a painful downward 
adjustment of private and public consumption impacting negatively total spending and 
quite likely asset values. 
 
What about a persistent trade surplus? Does it present any disadvantages for the 
countries concerned? Sustainability is not a problem here; so long as these countries 
are willing to expand credit to their trading partners, there is no economic mechanism 
that can compel them to eliminate the surplus. Profits, output and employment are all 
boosted by the trade surplus and, at first sight, it seems that there are only benefits to 
be had from a persistent trade surplus. But the crucial question again is what is 
happening to the productive capacity and how the trade surplus relates to it. For 
example, if the trade surplus arises from the export of exhaustible natural resources 
and productive capacity remains stagnant, it is evident that the potential benefits of 
the trade surplus are wasted. 
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Even if the trade surplus is due to exports of industrial goods and productive capacity 
relating to these goods grows at a sufficiently high rate, there is a question about the 
growth of productive capacity and the diffusion of benefits to the rest of the economy. 
Thus, a persistent trade surplus due to the international superiority of a particular 
industrial sector, cannot be deemed satisfactory if it is accompanied with insufficient 
investment and unemployment in the rest of the economy.  
 
The importance of growth in productive capacity, when assessing the desirability of 
profits which arise from a trade surplus, is made clear by considering the case of a 
stationary economy. In such an economy, a trade surplus implies that consumption 
and the standard of living are lower than what the economy is capable of. And, of 
course, it is the opposite with a persistent trade deficit. Consumption and the standard 
of living are kept above the level that the economy is capable of, despite the loss of 
profits caused by the trade deficit. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that the trade surplus cannot 
be considered to be an unambiguously beneficial source of profits, as is the case with 
private investment. The latter is certain to positively affect productive capacity and, 
therefore, the profits arising from investment are unambiguously beneficial to the 
economy. But this certainty does not exist with respect to the profits arising from the 
trade surplus. These profits may or may not be beneficial, depending on how they 
relate and the extent to which they contribute to the growth in productive capacity. 
 
2.3  Budget deficit 
 
The budget deficit is the only source of profits which is completely under the 
government’s control and constitutes, therefore, the most amenable policy instrument 
for controlling the level of profits and economic activity. Nevertheless, the budget 
deficit needs to be financed and, for this reason, its effect on profits and economic 
activity may be moderated depending on the financing method used and the 
accompanying monetary policy. The problem is that the financing of the budget 
deficit tends to affect adversely the other sources of profits. Private investment, 
consumption out of profits and saving out of wages are all affected to a varying 
degree, which cannot be determined theoretically but is a matter of empirical 
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estimation on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the effectiveness of this policy 
instrument has been an issue of controversy, since Keynes’ General Theory presented 
a strong argument for its use in overcoming the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 
Let us examine how the financing of the budget affects the other determinants of 
profits. A budget deficit implies that taxation and any other possible sources of 
revenue do not suffice to finance government expenditure and, consequently, resort to 
borrowing is inescapable. 
 
Borrowing may take two directions: 1) borrowing from the central bank and 2) 
borrowing from the public. Both directions affect the monetary policy stance and 
change the supply of money. Borrowing form the central bank increases in effect the 
supply of money unless the central bank takes countervailing compensatory 
(“sterilizing”) action. If the central bank does not take such action, then the budget 
deficit has the maximum potency in increasing profits as none of the other 
determinants of profits is affected adversely.6 Keynes’ advocacy of a budget deficit in 
the midst of the Great Depression, presumed of course that financing of the deficit 
would be done by the central bank in a permissive manner, allowing the money 
supply to increase and defusing any upward pressure on interest rates. It may be noted 
that in this instance net public debt is not affected; given state ownership of the 
central bank, one part of the state simply borrows from another without affecting state 
obligations in the hands of the public. 
 
Borrowing from the public, in order to finance the budget deficit, has quite different 
effects if the central bank is passive. To start with, in the absence of any reaction by 
the central bank, the monetary stance becomes tighter and interest rates tend to rise. 
To the extent that interest rates actually rise and investment is interest-sensitive, 
private investment will fall thus partly offsetting the boost in profits from the budget 
deficit. Moreover, consumption out of profits and savings out of wages may also be 
interest-sensitive, with consumption weakening and savings encouraged by rising 
                                                
6 On the contrary, a passive central bank stance tends to soften interest rates and provide further 
support to the budgetary boost in aggregate spending and profits. This is because lower interest rates 
tend to encourage private investment and consumption out of profits while discouraging saving out of 
wages. 
14 
 
interest rates. If this is so, there will be a further offsetting effect on the budget 
deficit’s boost in profits. 
 
From the above, it becomes apparent that the profits-boosting effect of a budget 
deficit is fully present only when monetary policy ensures that interest rates do not 
rise. Profits increase by the size of the budget deficit, if monetary policy is 
accommodating and interest rates are not affected; if interest rates are allowed to rise, 
the increase in profits will be moderated and may even be eliminated. This will 
depend on the extent to which private investment, consumption out of profits and 
savings out of wages are interest-sensitive. It is even imaginable (though not likely in 
practice) that these determinants of profits react in an adverse manner so strongly to a 
rise in interest rates, causing profits to actually fall. 
 
Does it make any difference whether the borrowing is from the domestic market or 
foreign lenders? In the latter case, the relevant interest rate is the one ruling in the 
international capital market in which the loan is raised. This is not likely to rise 
because of monetary tightening but it will tend to rise because of the increasing 
perceived risk with the size of the deficit and especially the already existing public 
debt. Nevertheless, domestic interest rates need not be affected and, therefore, 
financing from abroad will likely moderate the profits-boosting effect of a budget 
deficit less than the equivalent borrowing from the domestic market. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the profits-boosting effect of a budget deficit may also 
be moderated for a quite different reason totally unrelated to its mode of financing. 
We have seen that total spending and profits depend on interest rates and that, as a 
result, financing the budget deficit from the public may even lead, through an increase 
in interest rates, to a fall in total spending and profits. But even if total spending 
unambiguously rises (as in the case of central bank financing of the deficit), the 
increase in total spending and profits may be moderated by an increase in imports and 
a consequent reduction in the export surplus. Imports are normally related to total 
spending and to the extent that the budget deficit increases total spending, imports 
will rise and the export surplus will fall. The strength of the dependence of imports on 
total spending thus becomes an important determinant of the budget deficit’s impact 
on profits. Because of this, the budget deficit’s positive effect on profits will be 
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moderated but will remain positive so long as the increase in total spending is not 
fully matched by an increase in imports. 
 
The dependence of imports on total spending means that, whatever the source of an 
increase in total spending, the effect on profits will be moderated by the resulting 
increase in imports and reduction in the export surplus. Consequently, this applies 
with equal force to all the other sources of profits. Not only a budget deficit but also 
private investment, exports, consumption out of profits and saving out of wages affect 
profits through total spending. To the extent that imports are also affected, the effect 
on profits will be diminished.  
 
It is evident that the point above could have been made already in the previous 
discussion of sources of profits and, in particular, regarding private investment. It may 
equally well be made in the ensuing discussion of consumption out of profits and 
saving out of wages. To avoid repetition, it will not be mentioned again but its general 
applicability to all sources of profits should be borne in mind.  
 
Another question of a general nature may best be dealt with at this point. This 
concerns the distinction between real and nominal (or monetary) magnitudes. 
Obviously, profits and their sources are expressed in monetary terms. So long as 
prices are constant, monetary and real magnitudes move together and need not to be 
distinguished. But if prices change, the two may be out of step. It is then not clear 
whether the increase in a source of profits, such as the budget deficit, increase profits 
in real terms or solely in monetary ones. Profits, in such an instance, will increase no 
doubt in monetary terms (subject to the qualifications already mentioned) but, the 
question is, will their command over real resources increase correspondingly? 
 
The answer to this question is of considerable importance in assessing the value of the 
contribution that a source of profits makes to the health of the corporate sector. It does 
not matter so much in the case of the first two sources considered (i.e. private 
investment and export surplus) because an increase in either one of them does not 
shift real resources away from the corporate sector. On the contrary, all the rest (i.e. 
budget deficit, consumption out of profits and saving out wages) involve in the first 
instance a shift of resources out of the corporate sector’s control. 
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The budget deficit as a source of profits is the one that has the most ambiguous effects 
on the vigor of the corporate sector. Depending on the state of the economy, a budget 
deficit may either strengthen or weaken the corporate sector. The exact effects depend 
not only on the specific circumstances characterizing the economy but also the 
direction and patterns of state spending (on which more below). Abstracting from the 
form of state spending, a couple of general statements may be made as follows: First, 
a budget deficit in an economy characterized by unemployed resources and spare 
productive capacity is more likely to increase the corporate sector’s control over real 
resources and contribute to its strengthening. The reason is that, in such 
circumstances, an increase in total spending is not likely to raise prices much and the 
increase in profits, resulting from the budget deficit, effectively enlarges the corporate 
sector’s command over real resources. 
 
Second, a budget deficit in an economy characterized by fully or nearly fully 
employed resources will most likely reduce the corporate sector’s control over real 
resources and will tend to weaken it. This is because, in these circumstances, an 
increase in total spending is much more likely to lead to higher prices rather than 
expand production. As a result, the increase in profits resulting from the budget deficit 
will command a smaller amount of real resources. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that in conditions of full or near-full 
employment, with inflation being perceived as the main threat to the economy’s stable 
progress, business interests will reasonably wish that the state does not run budget 
deficits. A long period of stable growth creates the preconditions for a widely shared 
optimistic outlook regarding an economy’s stability and growth prospects. The setting 
is then ripe for political platforms demanding the banning of budget deficits.7 
                                                
7 This may provide at least a part of the explanation for the European Union’s Growth and Stability 
Pact, which limits the ability of member states to run budget deficits. For other arguments regarding 
business opposition to the use of budget deficits for boosting profits, see M. Kalecki’s classic 1943 
article “Political aspects of full employment” in Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist 
Economy 1933-1970, Cambridge University Press, 1971. A most important one is that budget deficits 
undermine a fundamental tenet of capitalist moral ideology. The moral precept that “you shall earn 
your bread in sweat” is undermined by budget transfers subsidizing consumption. This is noted by 
Kalecki but there is a further implication that is not emphasized sufficiently. Legitimizing budget 
deficits destroys the common identification in the public mind between good private housekeeping and 
good government, since it allows that the rules for good housekeeping are not valid and may even be 
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On the other hand, in times of economic crisis and stable if not falling prices, it is 
again quite reasonable for business interests to demand the running of budget deficits. 
The political demand is then mostly for tax reductions rather than more state 
spending. The strong preference for tax reductions over state-spending increases of an 
equal magnitude may seem paradoxical at first sight, given that the latter are more 
effective than the former in increasing total spending. The reason for which increases 
in state expenditure boost total spending more than equal-size tax reductions is 
because the latter result in some increase in saving.8  
 
A possible explanation for the insistence on tax reductions rather than equivalent 
increases in state expenditure may relate to the relative share of real resources 
controlled by the state and the private sector respectively. Tax reductions increase the 
relative share of the private sector while state expenditure reduces its relative share. 
Thus, though a budget deficit cannot fail to benefit the private sector, the share of 
resources under its control, relative to that of the state, benefits more with tax 
reductions than with state expenditure increases. 
 
Also, politically, a tax reduction is more attractive because it affects directly a larger 
as a rule number of voters and, therefore, it tends to have a wider public support, 
especially if across-the-board tax cuts benefit all tax-payers. Moreover, tax reductions 
are in tune with the permanent demand by business interests for pushing back the 
growth of the state and limiting its influence over the economy. This, more or less 
permanent, political posture by business interests is due to fear about the form that 
public expenditure may take. Such fear is not unjustified, given that state expenditure 
often takes forms that not only harm some business interests (while increasing overall 
                                                                                                                                       
pernicious for the government’s proper management of the capitalist economy. The realisation that 
under capitalism the government should obey rules which are contrary to those of capitalist moral 
ideology, provokes cognitive dissonance and incites questioning of the paradoxical nature of the 
capitalist system.  
8 This was first shown clearly in Haavelmo T. (1945), “Multiplier Effects of a Balanced Budget”, 
Econometrica, October. Haavelmo showed that because state expenditure expands total spending more 
than an equal-size tax reduction contracts it, a balanced budget is not neutral but expansionary and 
becomes more so as its size increases. 
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profits) but, most importantly, may damage the long-term prospects of business 
enterprise.9 
 
Let us now turn to the various forms that state expenditure may take and consider 
their effect on the private sector. Are some types of state expenditure more acceptable 
to business interests and the private sector than others? 
 
There is no doubt that this is so. Public goods, which cannot be produced profitably 
by the private sector, constitute clearly a class of state expenditure that is not only 
acceptable but may be also desirable to business interests. Thus, public expenditure 
for the maintenance and improvement of defense, the legal system and for securing 
law and order are all desirable directions for state expenditure. In addition, to the 
extent that the state has historically assumed responsibility for the provision of 
transport infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, ports etc., state spending for the 
maintenance and improvement of this infrastructure can be favorable to the private 
sector, especially by making it internationally more competitive. This may be also the 
case for other infrastructure relating to energy, communications, health and sanitation, 
R and D and others, though the lines here, between what can be produced profitably 
by private sector and what needs to be provided by the state, are not clearly drawn and 
may well be in dispute. 
 
In general, it is better for the private sector if the state does not actively engage in 
production but only spends in commissioning private firms to provide goods and 
services on its behalf. The state must then take care to commission in a fair manner 
without favoring or discriminating against any particular firm. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that a state will completely abstain from active engagement in production. In 
that case, the private sector stands to gain if state production (i) increases directly or 
indirectly the productivity of private sector activities by reducing their cost or 
improving their quality; (ii) does not compete directly with any private sector 
activities; and (iii) does not reduce the scope of private enterprise by forestalling it in 
potentially profitable directions. 
                                                
9   This is notably the case, as argued below, when state spending is directed to increasing the 
proportion of the labor force employed in the public sector. Such spending not only deprives the private 
sector of trained labor but also damages business prospects by increasing bureaucratic meddling and 
regulatory controls on business activity. 
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It is clear that in practice most of public expenditure is not directed to activities that 
meet the above conditions. Not only the state produces good and services that may 
also be produced possibly better by the private sector but often a considerable, if not 
the largest, part of public expenditure is directed to the cause of social justice, 
involving sizeable transfer payments and other redistributive measures. 
 
Moreover, the state bureaucracy, the salaries of which may absorb most of public 
expenditure, is often excessive both in terms of civil servant numbers and regulatory 
complexity. Thus, it imposes unnecessary costs both to the operation of the private 
sector and the public as a whole while, at the same time, it reduces the resources and 
especially the manpower available to the private sector. Finally, a large state 
bureaucracy might promote and eventually instill an anti-business attitude not only 
among state employees but also in the wider society, creating a public mentality and a 
socio-political environment that are inimical to entrepreneurship and profit-oriented 
business activities. 
 
In conclusion, state expenditure is a risky way of increasing total profits for business 
interests. Even though it is more effective than an equal-size tax reduction, it also 
presents more dangers. It may antagonize directly some business interests; reduce the 
scope of private sector activities; reduce the share of the private sector’s control over 
resources relative to the state’s share; reduce the availability of manpower and 
resources to the private sector. But, most importantly, if may undermine the long-term 
prospects and viability of private enterprise. And certainly (as Kalecki has noted) it 
undermines the business ideology, according to which economic progress and the 
economy’s health depend exclusively on the views and actions of business leaders, 
and establishes the state as a major actor with a decisive role in the running of the 
economy. For these reasons, it is understandable that, in seeking higher total profits 
and a revived economy through a budget deficit, business interests invariably opt for 
reduced taxes rather than increased state spending. 
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2.4  Consumption out of profits 
 
Consumption out of profits depends on the corporate sector’s dividends policy, as 
well as on the saving propensity of the firms-owning households. Profits retained by 
the firms and not distributed to the firm’s owners cannot possibly be consumed and 
constitute a considerable part of overall saving. Households which own firms’ shares 
are on average higher-income households and tend to have a higher than average 
propensity to save. Given that a large proportion of profits are saved in the form of 
firms’ retained earnings and a sizeable part of dividends tends to be saved, 
consumption out of profits is normally small. 
 
Though smaller than the previously considered sources of profits, such consumption 
spending is of major importance to the sales of luxury goods and services. It is worth 
noting that spending on luxuries has increased considerably in recent times at least 
until the 2008 crisis not only in developed economies but also in the emerging ones, 
such as Russia and China. This may mean one or more of the following developments 
are taking place: 1) the share of profits in national income is increasing; 2) the part of 
profits paid out in dividends is increasing; 3) the psychology and spending habits of 
profits recipients is changing in more ostentatious, exclusive and hedonistic 
directions; 4) luxury goods and services are becoming “democratized” and more 
affordable to an increasing mass of consumers with rising incomes and middle-class 
aspirations. There are indications that all of these may be happening to a varying 
degree in different economies.  
 
Another development that may account, either in conjunction with one or more of the 
above or even completely on its own, for the recent “luxury fever”10 relates to the 
macroeconomic policies which led to the 2008 financial crisis. This operates through 
the propensity to save of profits recipients. The propensity to save out of dividends (as 
well as the corresponding propensity to consume, which is its inverse) is not only 
determined by the size of income but also by the size of wealth or, more accurately, 
perceived wealth. Wealth affects the precautionary motive for saving. Thus, higher 
                                                
10 This is the title of R. H. Frank’s book. Writing in the late 1990s, Frank emphasizes the first and third 
of the developments mentioned above as being relevant to the U.S. at the time. See, Robert H. Frank 
(1999), Luxury Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess, Princeton University Press. 
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perceived wealth provides assurance and tends to assuage the precautionary motive 
leading to more spending out of current income. The rise in the propensity to consume 
out of distributed profits increases consequently the demand for and sales of luxury 
goods and services.  
 
Given the above mechanism, the question is what macroeconomic developments led 
to the perception of greater wealth? The answer is clear: The long-standing US policy 
of cheap money and easy mortgage lending led to rapidly rising house prices, greater 
spending power through mortgage refinancing and a perception of greater wealth. 
This perception was widespread not only among dividends recipients but was shared 
also by households without profits income. The perception of rapidly increasing 
wealth was being reinforced for shares-owning households by the rising shares prices 
in a buoyant stock exchange, which were also due to the same low-interest, easy 
money policy combined with an absence of inflationary pressures.  
 
We need not dwell here on the reasons for the persistent macroeconomic policies and 
conditions characterizing the U.S. economy prior to the 2008 crisis, which would 
have led us to a discussion of fundamental international-trade imbalances and, 
ultimately, to geo-political speculations. It suffices to draw the conclusions regarding 
the factors that can affect consumption out of profits and may thus play a role in the 
determination of the volume of profits. These, as we have seen, extend from the 
corporate sector’s dividends policy, to all the factors which may affect the propensity 
to save out of dividends. These latter range from macroeconomic policies to psycho-
social developments, the common characteristic of which is that their effects on 
consumption out of profits are, in all cases, non-intentional and unplanned.  
 
2.5  Savings out of wages 
 
The factors at play here resemble to a considerable extent those which affect 
consumption out of profits. The propensity to save (or its inverse, the propensity to 
consume) holds the center of the stage in both cases. There is, nevertheless, an 
important difference: The discretional margin is likely to be much smaller in the case 
of wages. The propensity to save out of wages is very small and its variation is within 
a very limited range. On the contrary, the propensity to save out of profits may vary 
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considerably between different societies and, even within the same society, between 
different historical periods. 
 
Why is this? The propensity to save out of wages tends to be very small in poor 
societies because workers are close to subsistence level and cannot afford to abstain 
from consumption. In richer societies, the physical constraint may not be operative 
but rising material expectations and social imitation play a similarly constraining role. 
 
The higher consumption level of one’s neighbor is emulated as one’s needs tend to 
grow in the presence of neighbors with a higher material standard of living. There is 
considerable empirical evidence that one’s sense of well-being is relative and depends 
on comparisons made with others in the local environment. Moreover, there is by now 
a lot of experimental work supporting the view that the evolved human brain is hard-
wired to evaluate personal well-being not independently of others but on the basis of 
comparison with some social group, which is considered to be relevant in the 
particular context.11 “Keeping up with the Joneses” and developing similar spending 
habits is thus neither an arbitrary behavior nor due to envy but the product of human 
evolution. 
 
Though wages tend to be fully spent and the propensity to save out of wages is 
generally very low, it is an intriguing question what would happen if it were high. 
This counterfactual case delineates the limits of an analysis based on social class and 
the unencumbered reproduction of a profit-regulated market system and, for this 
reason, it may be worth considering. 
 
On the one hand, workers would become owners of firms’ shares and would 
participate in the firms’ ownership, with their working and consumption behavior, as 
well as their economic interests, becoming over time indistinguishable from those of 
rentier  households. On the other hand, total spending and profits would fall unless the 
other sources of profits increased to an equivalent extent. But there is no compelling 
reason why exports and private investment might increase in the face of a fall in total 
                                                
11 R. H. Frank, op. cit., provides plenty of references to experiments mostly by psychologists 
throughout the book and especially in chapter 9, which is titled “Why context and position are so 
important”. 
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spending and profits. It is difficult to imagine a plausible mechanism through which 
any source of profits, other than the government budget, might pick up the slack in 
total spending and profits caused by increased savings out of wages. Budget deficits 
thus become essential for the preservation of the profits’ level. The alternative, of 
course, is that profits fall as the propensity to save out of wages increase. In either 
case, the smooth reproduction of a profit-regulated market system becomes 
problematical and the road is paved for its transformation into a, possibly classless or 
permanently state-assisted, different system. 
 
Let us at this point explore briefly the implications of widely different propensities to 
save out of profits, so as to compare them with the low variation of saving 
propensities out of wages. A very high propensity to save out of profits would mean 
that the firms-owning households are frugal and their consumption behavior is 
characterized by what Max Weber termed the “Protestant ethic” rather than the 
typically spendthrift rentier mentality. In this case, the economy would tend to 
increase rapidly its productive capacity, as few resources would be used for their 
needs and the production of luxuries. Moreover, the frugal life-style of the richer 
firms-owning households, by setting the standard to be emulated by the rest of the 
society, would tend to keep in check the rising material aspirations and consumption 
of the workers’ households. By increasing productivity through investment in 
productive capacity and controlling the rise in consumption and real wages, such an 
economy would be strong in international competitiveness and export performance.  
 
A contrasting outcome is likely to emerge in the case of a very low propensity to save 
out of profits. Even though, in a static comparison, total profits would be higher than 
in the high propensity case, the dynamic tendencies and prospects of such an economy 
are less bright. A large part of the productive resources are devoted to luxuries and the 
consumption needs of the firms-owning households, which exhibit a typical rentier 
mentality. Fewer resources are available for investment and, as a result, productive 
capacity grows at a slower pace. At the same time, the rentiers’ standard of living  
drifts apart from that of the workers and social inequalities widen. The high 
consumption of the rentiers becomes the reference point for the material aspirations of 
the society as a whole and this leads to social tension, demands for higher (real) 
wages and labor unrest. In these conditions, an inflationary wage-price spiral is likely 
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to appear, as the overt symptom of the underlying battle over the distribution of 
income and consumption that is being fought between workers and rentiers. 
Meanwhile, the growth of productive capacity is weak, as the distribution fight tends 
to divert the already inadequate resources available for investment to the production 
of consumption goods. Such an economy is unlikely to be internationally competitive 
and quite likely to suffer from chronic deficits in its international balance of 
payments, leading to repeated devaluations and a weak domestic currency. The root 
cause of its weakness is the overly costly upkeep of its rentier class, which is the exact 
mirror image of the very low propensity to save out of profits. 
 
After this digression (which might better belong to section 2.4 above), let us now 
return to the propensity to save out of wages, to consider an interesting recent 
development. It has been argued that this is as a rule very low, so that its negative 
influence on total profits is not substantial. But recently it became possible for this 
propensity to have a positive influence on total profits. This is the result of savings out 
of wages not only being completely eliminated but even turning negative. Spending 
out of wages can exceed wages only if past savings are spent or borrowing becomes 
possible for wage earners. It is in fact the latter possibility that has actually 
materialized. 
 
In many countries, consumer credit was made available on a large scale, as 
deregulation of the banking system became the fashion, initially in Britain and the US 
and then widely imitated in the rest of the world. The growth in consumer credit was 
aided by the cheap money policy and rising asset prices, especially the rapid rise in 
house prices, which (as noted in section 2.4 above) created the widespread perception 
of greater wealth and weakened the precautionary motive for saving. 
 
Deregulation increased the competitive pressures in the banking system and the new 
field of consumer credit was one of the most fiercely contested. Loans for 
consumption spending were offered freely, often just for the asking. The laxity of 
lending standards is famously captured in the description of such loans as NINJA, an 
acronym standing for “no income, no job or assets”. 
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Under these conditions, the abetting influence of advertising together with the rising 
social mentality of consumerism, could hardly fail to lead to a considerable 
indebtedness of the wage-earning class. This indebtedness, of course, increased total 
spending and augmented the volume of profits. In this way, the propensity to save out 
of wages was made recently to play a positive rather than negative role in the 
determination of total profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The sustainability of profits 
 
Policies designed to stimulate economic activity inevitably aim to strengthen 
profitability and profits. Though profits can be increased by policies which affect 
appropriately any of the profits; sources examined above, not all sources can provide 
sustainable profits. Stimulatory policies based on some of these sources may produce 
counterforces, which weaken their intended positive impact on profits either from the 
start or over time, even to the point of ultimately negating the initial impact. 
 
A general (though not the only) reason for this impact neutralization (or even 
reversal), is that the different sources can be quite interrelated rather than independent 
of each other. Consequently, an increase in one of them, which ceteris paribus would 
result in higher profits, causes another one to change in a way that tends to lower 
profits. The final effect thus becomes uncertain and, in any case, is definitely 
weakened. An instance of an obvious inter-relation, which weakens rather than 
reverses the primary impact, is that between the export surplus and all the others (as 
noted in section 2.3). Other instances of such inter-relations have also been examined 
at various points in the discussion of the different profits’ sources but clear 
conclusions regarding the relative sustainability of these sources still remain to be 
drawn. It is evident that this is of crucial importance in designing effective policies for 
the stimulation of economic activity.  
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We will proceed by examining each one of the profits’ sources in turn. In 
concentrating exclusively on the question of sustainability, some already trodden 
ground cannot be avoided in the attempt to explore certain novel considerations. 
 
3.1  Private investment sustainability 
 
 Investment does not affect the other sources of profits adversely. As has been noted 
(section 2.1), it is the only source which unequivocally increases the productive 
capacity of the economy and expands the choices open to society. Its social 
desirability is thus widely accepted. It may be questioned only on the basis of a global 
environmentalist viewpoint, which considers that continued economic growth poses a 
grave risk to the survival of the planet and, therefore, an absolute halt to growth is 
imperative. 
 
Leaving the potential environmentalist objection aside, is investment a sustainable 
source of profits? It would seem that its limits are set by its own success. A rapid 
growth in the productive  capacity for an extended period, may put a lid on the 
production of consumption goods, keeping the standard of living lower than the 
majority of the population might wish (to the possible benefit of future generations). 
This is quite possible under a determined authoritarian regime but in a democratic 
society such an eventuality seems unlikely. Nevertheless, even in the latter, periods of 
relative poverty and hardship for the most disadvantaged social groups cannot be 
excluded when investment absorbs for long a large share of productive resources. 
 
In the above case, the limits to the sustainability of profits which arise from private 
investment are political rather than economic. But economic limits are also possible. 
In fact, it is exactly the economic limits to overinvestment that classical business 
theories have been concerned with. Overinvestment is due to excessive optimism of 
the investing firms relative to their actual performance, resulting in capital losses. It is 
useful to distinguish between overinvestment which is generalized and characterizes 
the economy as a whole and that which is limited and concentrated in one or more, 
albeit important, sectors of the economy. 
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In the former case, overinvestment might with equal reason be seen as 
underconsumption, since consumers’ demand does not keep pace with the growth in 
productive capacity. It should then be possible to increase total demand by 
redistributing income in favor of low-income groups, which have a higher propensity 
to spend. Alternatively, following the typical Keynesian recipe, the state could 
intervene to fill in the deficiency in total spending. Thus, generalized overinvestment 
is the mirror image of underconsumption and can be treated in the usual way that 
underconsumption is dealt with. In this case, the underlying disproportionality is in 
the distribution of income between profits and wage recipients. More accurately, 
given that investing firms are not strictly constrained by their current profits, the 
disproportionality is in the potential to command resources between profits and wage 
recipients.  
 
In the latter case of a sectorial overinvestment, even though the problem may not be 
so grave, an obvious policy response is not so evident. The excessive productive 
capacity of the overinvested sector needs to be reduced or stay idle until the 
disproportionality in the sectorial distribution of productive resources is eliminated. 
This is not easily remedied, as there is no policy intervention that is obviously 
appropriate and any relief takes time. Unemployment of the specialized resources 
involved, which probably include not only plant and machinery but also labor, may be 
unavoidable. Even if labor may be retrained, some social waste is inevitable. In the 
best possible case, of labor being fully retrained into equally well-paid occupations 
and of equipment being perfectly preserved without obsolescence, the costs of labor 
retraining and of storing and maintaining the equipment constitute a real social 
burden. Nevertheless, the social cost is not as great as it would be if generalized 
overinvestment were left without treatment to run its course.  
 
To use a medical analogy, a sectorial overinvestment is like a bone fracture or a 
common flu virus, which only time can heal and, despite some inconvenience, a 
healthy organism can easily take in its stride. In contrast, a generalized 
overinvestment is like a heart problem or some other vital organ malfunction, which 
requires an immediate operation, albeit a well-known and routine one. In the absence 
of an urgent treatment, even though it is a highly invasive one, the organism will 
suffer great damage and risk its survival. 
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Although the conceptual distinction between generalized and sectorial overinvestment 
is possible in theory, in practice the two tend to become entangled and difficult to 
distinguish. Private investment is carried out by many firms in different sectors 
independently of each other; it is not planned so as to maintain a rough sectorial 
balance. Consequently, the sectorial balance is fluctuating most of the time and thus 
overinvestment most likely first appears as a sectorial one. It is then a question of 
judgment to recognize the true nature of overinvestment. Is it truly sectorial or are 
sectorial imbalances within reasonable bounds and mask a brewing generalized 
overinvestment? Moreover, even if it is truly sectorial, a judgment needs to be made 
about its magnitude and power to mutate into a generalized one. If it is of a 
sufficiently large magnitude, the ripples it causes through unemployment and 
bankruptcies may spread to the rest of the economy and the initial sectorial 
overinvestment becomes indistinguishable from a generalized one 
 
The important policy question is what to do in the presence of such a mutant. What is 
the appropriate remedy for a seemingly generalized overinvestment, the root cause of 
which is sectorial overinvestment? One school of thought argues that the root cause 
needs to be addressed first and foremost. According to this, the sectorial 
disproportionalities must be corrected and policies appropriate to genuine generalized 
overinvestment, which increase aggregate demand without eliminating the 
disproportionalities, should be avoided. As there is no clear policy remedy for the 
elimination of disproportionalities, the market forces must be given time and allowed 
free play so as to restore the system’s health. The usual policy remedy for generalized 
overinvestment, in this view, is not only ineffectual but likely to worsen the problem 
through its adverse side-effects. Not only the disproportionalities are not corrected 
but, in addition, the increase in aggregate demand leads to misallocation of resources 
and most likely heightens the risk of inflation and adds to uncertainty. 
 
The contrary position is taken by the second school of thought. According to this, it is 
safer to consider the problem as one of generalized overinvestment even when it is 
sectorial in origin. If it spreads and shows signs of being contagious, it is best to treat 
it through an intervention that increases aggregate demand. This is because the social 
cost and the risk to the system can be grave if an immediate intervention is not made. 
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Moreover, the adverse side-effects of an intervention are far from certain and rarely so 
severe as to surpass the certain costs of unemployment, wasted productive resources, 
human hardship, danger to the socio-political institutions and potential damage to the 
social fabric, which a policy of non- intervention entails. In other words, the balance 
of risks indicates that the usual policy of increasing total spending, which is 
appropriate for generalized overinvestment, is the safer alternative and most likely to 
minimize social cost and avoid the worst. 
 
To use a medical analogy again: If the common flu virus affects a vital organ, an 
operation may become necessary and pressing even though it does not address the 
root cause. The risk of grave damage to the organism dictates the urgent use of an 
invasive rather than a “let nature take its course”, hands-off approach. 
  
It may be concluded that the appropriate policy in the case of a seemingly generalized 
overinvestment, which is nevertheless due to sectorial imbalances, is a question that 
should not be answered in a dogmatic manner. The policy to be adopted should be 
determined on the basis of a two-stage deliberation. First, there is a need of a correct 
diagnosis: Is the generalized overinvestment caused by serious sectorial imbalances 
and can these be clearly identified? Second, and this is usually the most difficult part, 
the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative policies need to be compared. 
More specifically, what needs to be assessed is the balance of risks between state 
intervention to boost aggregate demand, on the one hand, and refraining from such 
action so that market forces are allowed to deal with the problem, on the other. 
 
An important consideration is the time horizon of the assessment. Short-run and long-
run risks may be of different weight in the two alternatives, due to an almost 
philosophical difference. Indeed, the non-intervention school of thought focuses more 
on the long-run effects, arguing that both the beneficial effects of non-intervention 
and the detrimental effects of intervention take time to materialize. In contrast, the 
intervention school gives more weight to immediate and more proximate effects and 
seems to deem the notion of long-run equilibrium, in which long-run effects make 
themselves fully felt, to be of little relevance in an ever-changing world characterized 
by an inherently uncertain and unknowable future. In such a world, it is hubris to 
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consider human affairs in a timeless perspective and policy-making should heed 
Keynes’ famous dictum “in the long-run we are all dead”. 
 
It should also be recognized that more base interests may enter the comparative 
assessment of the two alternatives. For example, the politicians in charge of policy-
making tend to have a time horizon that rarely extends beyond the next elections; their 
time horizon getting shorter as elections get nearer. It is, therefore, not for 
philosophical reasons that they tend to be biased in favor of the intervention policy 
and short-run effects. Their bias for immediate results and intervention is further 
reinforced by the activism bias in democratic politics, as politicians need to convince 
the electorate that they are active and concerned rather than passive and indifferent in 
the presence of a problem. Other interests that may be at play include socialist 
preference for greater government involvement in the economy, which intervention 
makes possible. On the opposite side, political opponents of big government tend to 
dislike intervention and have a bias in favor of non-intervention.  
 
 
The partiality of interests and various biases, which are commonly enmeshed in the 
assessment of the alternatives, makes it difficult to reach the right decision. Though 
the choice between the two should not be made on the basis of partial interests or 
general doctrines but with an open mind and on a case-by-case basis, taking fully into 
account the specific circumstances of the particular overinvestment, this often does 
not prove possible. To resort once more to the medical analogy, the decision about the 
desirability or not of an operation cannot be left neither to a scalpel-waving surgeon 
with a financial interest in operating nor to a Jehovah witness who considers any 
invasive treatment as a sin and an affront to God’s wisdom.12 Yet, the public 
discussion of economic policy, even among experts, sometimes resembles a dialogue 
between a frenzied surgeon and a fanatical Jehovah witness. 
 
                                                
12 An example of the dangers of a Jehovah witness attitude in economic policy is afforded by the 2007-
8 international financial crisis. There is little doubt that the banking and financial sector had over-
expanded and that there was a sectorial imbalance not only in the US but even more clearly in Iceland 
and Ireland. There is equally little doubt that a Jehovah witness non-interventionist stance would be 
dangerous and that the balance of risks in these cases dictated extensive state intervention, if total 
economic collapse were to be avoided.  
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To briefly summarize this overlong section: Investment is a privileged source of 
profits because it unequivocally increases the productive capacity of the economy. 
Nevertheless, its sustainability is not assured. An overexpansion of investment may 
lead the economy into impasses from which it cannot easily escape. There is 
considerable controversy in economic theory about the policy responses which can 
provide appropriate escape routes. The art of policy-making consists in providing a 
correct diagnosis of the particular circumstances of a case and, more crucially, in 
assessing correctly the balance of risks involved in the alternative policy stances. 
 
3.2  Export surplus sustainability 
 
It has already been noted in section 2.2 above, that an export surplus does not 
unequivocally increase the productive capacity of the economy and, therefore, it 
compares unfavorably to investment as a source of profits. But compared to the other 
sources of profits, which also do not definitely increase the economy’s productive 
capacity, an export surplus is superior. The reason is that the claims on foreigners, 
which this source of profits gives rise to, increase the command over resources and 
wealth of the economy. 
The claims on foreigners resulting from export surplus are, apart from foreign 
currency, bonds issued by governments and private firms, as well as equities of 
existing and new firms. All these increase the national income of the export surplus 
country to the extent that interest and profits that is earned from them belong to its 
residents and, therefore, expand the consumption and investment possibilities 
available to them.  
 
Moreover, liquidation of these assets at any time in the future, can considerably 
increase the potential for both consumption and investment through importation of 
consumption and investment goods respectively. Consequently, the wealth and 
productive potential of the export surplus economy are effectively enhanced by the 
amount of the surplus.  
 
As regards the sustainability of profits created by an export surplus, it seems 
reasonably assured. So long as the export surplus persists, the profits from it, which 
are equal to the size of the surplus, can continue unabated. Unlike investment, which 
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may undermine profitability if it is misjudged or excessive (whether in sectorial terms 
or generally), an export surplus does not undermine profits. But can it continue 
indefinitely? 
 
There is undoubtedly a tendency for the currency of the export surplus country to 
appreciate relative to the currencies of its trading partners. As a result, its exports 
become more expensive for the trading partners while imports from them become 
cheaper. This tends to reduce and eventually eliminate the export surplus. But how 
reliably does this adjustment mechanism operate? 
 
Adjustment may take place very slowly and is often dominated by capital movements, 
which are influenced by relative growth and interest rates. Expected future changes in 
the latter and speculation also affect capital movements and may thus upend the 
adjustment process. Moreover, the adjustment may be impeded deliberately by the 
export surplus country. An exchange rate policy may be adopted with the aim of 
keeping the exchange rate low enough, so as to perpetuate the export surplus. This 
may be done by the central bank of the export surplus country buying bonds in the 
currencies of its trading partners, thus strengthening the net demand for such 
currencies relative to its own currency. In this way, the adjustment tendency may be 
counteracted and the export surplus retained for a long time, if not indefinitely.  
 
The historical evidence indicates that an export surplus can persist for a long time 
spanning many decades. Japan is an obvious case in point but there are also many 
others with varying spans of continuous export surplus, such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Germany and, more recently, China. These countries have managed to 
boost profits and economic activity by means of their persistent export surplus at the 
expense of their trading partners, which have experienced correspondingly lower 
profits.  
 
This “beggar thy neighbor” policy has not generally gone unchallenged and has often 
created friction among trading partners. Nevertheless, it has been proven viable and 
there is a variety of historical circumstances and special geo-political conditions, 
which have made possible the persistence of export surplus in each different case.  
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Is there any general statement that may be made at the level of principles? What may 
be stated in a general manner, is that the smaller the export surplus country and the 
greater the number of its trading partners, the more likely it is for the export surplus to 
be sustainable. The reason is that the loss in profits caused by the persistent export 
surplus to the trading partners’ economies is relatively small, so that retaliatory 
measures and strong political pressure are less imperative. Nevertheless, it is to be 
expected that some kind of retaliation in the form of higher tariffs or other trade 
barriers, as well as political protestation, will arise sooner or later from its main 
trading partners against a country, of at least a certain size, which has a persistent 
export surplus.  
 
An interesting case is that of an export surplus country, which happens to be a 
member of a currency union. Such a union has eliminated tariffs among its members, 
adopted a common currency and trades as a single country with the rest of the world. 
In this special case, a persistent export surplus by a member of the currency union 
relative to countries outside the union is unlikely to raise objections by these other 
countries, if their trade with the union as a whole is in balance.13 But this obviously 
means that the other countries participating in the currency union will have jointly a 
trade deficit with the rest of the world. At the same time, it is improbable that these 
countries will not also have a deficit in their trading within the union relative to the 
export surplus member country. As a result of both these deficits, the member 
countries will be subjected to a profits loss, fall in domestic economic activity and rise 
in unemployment. 
 
It should be noticed that the loss from the second of these two deficits, which 
emanates directly from trading with the export surplus country, is not necessarily the 
most important; the loss from the trade deficit with the rest of the world may be 
considerably larger. The latter is due to the union’s common exchange rate, which is 
influenced by the export surplus country. In the absence of an export surplus with the 
rest of the world, the union’s exchange rate would be lower and the trade deficit of the 
other union members would diminish and tend to disappear.  
                                                
13 This is the case of Germany in the Eurozone and, given its relevance to contemporary developments, 
it possibly merits a close examination. For this reason, not only the remainder of this paragraph but also 
the rest of this section are devoted to the discussion of this special case. 
 
34 
 
 
It stands to reason that, given the adverse effects of the export surplus on the other 
members of the union, these members would be displeased with the persistent export 
surplus. Consequently, in the special case where there is no protest by the union’s 
trading partners which find their trade with the union to be  in balance, there is likely 
discontent and calls for corrective action to eliminate the surplus by the other union 
members. The obvious corrective action is for the export surplus country to take 
appropriate measures, so as to expand its domestic aggregate demand.14  
 
In the absence of an expansion in aggregate demand, the discontent of the other union 
members may possibly be assuaged if the export surplus country transfers to them 
enough purchasing power. This may be done by buying all kinds of assets, including 
bonds, equities and real estate, from the trade deficit countries equal to their full 
deficit, thus replenishing purchasing power within their economies. But even if such a      
compensation is deemed acceptable, there are distinct bounds to this solution. 
 
 Buying equities makes little sense when profits in these countries are deficient and, 
apart from speculative buying in an inevitably short-lived stock exchange bubble, the 
limits are obvious. In the case of bonds, there may be more leeway if private and 
especially government debt is at a low level to start with. But here too, there are 
inescapable limits. These are more evident for the generally riskier bonds of private 
firms, where there are conventional ceilings to the acceptable levels of debt. The 
limits for sovereign bonds may be less discernible but they are not less real. Once the 
financial markets have formed a view about the acceptable level of government debt 
in each particular case, the sale of sovereign bonds beyond that level becomes 
practically impossible. Finally, real estate buying may continue for a while but sooner 
or later prices are likely to shoot up and a bubble will develop, the eventual bursting 
of which can be very painful not only to recent buyers but also to banks which have 
provided mortgages. 
 
                                                
14 This will increase demand for imports, thus limiting the export surplus. In addition, there will be a 
tendency for an acceleration in price rises, which would further contract the export surplus by reducing 
exports. In this way, increasing aggregate demand will eventually eliminate the export surplus.  
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Are the boundaries of a persistent export surplus fully drawn? There seems to be a 
further possibility. The export surplus country may compensate the protesting trade-
deficit union members by providing government aid. The limits here are clearly 
political. It is unlikely that the voters in the export surplus country will vote for a 
government, which is willing to give foreign aid of the magnitude required to offset 
the union members’ trade deficits. Consequently, in the end, the imperatives of 
parliamentary democracy set the limits of a persistent export policy. 
 
 Once the final limit is reached, the choice is either the abandonment of the export 
surplus policy or the risking of a break-up in the currency union. In these 
circumstances, if the export surplus country persists with this policy, the deficit trade 
countries face a particularly painful dilemma: Acceptance of the loss in profits, 
economic activity, income and employment or exit from the currency union? 
 
The decision to exit the currency union is painful because it can prove disastrous. 
Even though exit will allow the trade deficit countries to set the exchange rate for 
their own new currency at a sufficiently low rate, so as to eliminate their trade 
imbalance, an immediate sizeable reduction in their income and consumption is 
unavoidable. Moreover, the shock to the business climate and confidence from a 
decision to exit may result in a drop in private investment causing a greater loss in 
profits than that due to the trade deficit. The shock will be particularly intense if the 
exit takes place at a time when borrowing from the financial markets is difficult. 
Borrowing then becomes impossible and so does servicing of the existing debt, 
making bankruptcy inevitable.  
 
Under these conditions, it is evident that exiting the currency union can be suicidal. If 
a helping hand is offered by the export surplus country in order to stay in the union, it 
will be difficult to reject such an offer. The aid provided by the export surplus country 
does not need to be so large as to offset the trade deficit of the distressed union 
member. It suffices that it provides immediate relief and offers a plausible road path 
out of the impasse in due time. The road path will require reform measures to be 
undertaken by the trade deficit country, in order to strengthen competitiveness, and 
the implementation of the agreed reforms will be made a strict condition for the 
provision of aid. Such minimal aid, offered as a token of solidarity rather than as a 
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necessary compensation for the continuation of the export surplus policy, may be 
politically acceptable to the electorate of the export surplus country. In this way, the 
boundaries of a persistent export surplus may be extended for a considerable time. 
 
The conclusion of this lengthy discussion on a persistent export surplus policy in the 
context of a currency union, is that its sustainability limits are ultimately political. 
Market forces are not capable on their own of putting an end to a determined export 
surplus policy. Even though tariffs cannot be used as a political weapon inside a 
currency union, the threat of exit by the aggrieved members is a possible weapon. At 
the same time, politics within the export surplus country define the extent of 
concessions that are likely to be made, in order to avoid a breakup of the currency 
union. Thus, political considerations, within not only the trade deficit countries but 
also the export surplus country, determine the ultimate limits of export surplus 
sustainability.  
 
 
 
3.3  Budget deficit sustainability 
 
A budget deficit requires borrowing by the government. So, the first question that 
needs to be faced concerns the limits to borrowing. A clear distinction needs to be 
made here between borrowing in domestic currency and borrowing in foreign 
currency. The former is far easier, since domestic currency is under the government’s 
control and can become available to the government in unlimited quantities. The latter 
presents much greater difficulties and is clearly a more complex problem. 
Consequently, the discussion below mostly concentrates on the examination of the 
limits to borrowing in foreign currency, with only limited comments addressed 
sporadically to the domestic currency case. 
 
 The limits to borrowing in foreign currency are dependent on the expectations of 
lenders regarding the borrowing government’s ability (and, of course, willingness) to 
meet its obligations. Since expectations are changeable and influenced by the general 
business climate, the limits are not set in stone and are often hazy from afar. Once 
reached, they are rigidly binding but their exact position is not always clear far in 
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advance. A worsening in the terms of borrowing (i.e. rise in the interest rate) is an 
indication that the limits are getting closer, especially when the interest rise is 
accelerating. 
 
A major factor in the determination of the borrowing limits is the size of the deficit in 
relation to the gross domestic product (GDP). The greater the budget deficit as a 
proportion of GDP, the more likely it becomes that the borrowing terms will worsen. 
But the cost of borrowing depends also, and more crucially, on the already existing 
debt. The higher the outstanding debt as a percentage of GDP, the higher is likely to 
be the interest rate at which borrowing is possible. Even a smaller deficit may be, 
ceteris paribus, more costly to finance than a larger one, if the outstanding debt is 
higher. The reason, of course, is that the larger debt increases the risk that the 
government may not be able to meet its debt obligations in the future. 
 
Though the size of the deficit and especially the debt, both in relation to GDP, are 
possibly the major factors in determining the costs of and limits to borrowing, they 
are not the only ones. The cost of borrowing also depends on other factors, the most 
important of which concern the economy’s growth prospects. These influence the 
future evolution of the debt to GDP ratio and, therefore, are relevant to the pricing of 
government debt by the financial markets.  
 
It should be noticed that the growth prospects are dependent, among other things, on 
the nature of the government budget and its deficit and, more specifically, on the 
direction of expenditure. If expenditure is directed to investment, then it contributes to 
the growth of productive capacity and enables future GDP growth.15 If, on the other 
hand, it is directed to consumption, then the deficit does not improve the economy’s 
growth prospects and, as future debt in relation to GDP is likely to increase, the risk 
of default increases and so does the cost of borrowing. 
 
                                                
15 It is, of course, possible that the use of productive resources for investment (or for that matter 
consumption) is inefficient and wasteful. In this case, investment may not contribute to the growth or 
replenishment of productive capacity. This possibility is generally abstracted from, except when the 
focus is on the question of efficiency and an explicit distinction is drawn between efficient and 
inefficient investment (or consumption).   
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It is worth noting, that the above consideration concerning the risk of default, does not 
arise in the same clear-cut manner when borrowing is in domestic currency. The 
reason is that the government is in effect the sole producer of domestic currency. 
Though it does not produce it directly, it can always create new currency by 
borrowing from the central bank, which is nominally in charge of currency creation. 
 
Nevertheless, the deterioration or, at least, lack of improvement in the economy’s 
growth prospects, as a result of borrowing for consumption rather than investment, is 
not without consequences on the limits of borrowing, even in the case of domestic 
currency. The latter also may be affected adversely but in a more roundabout way, 
through the effects that borrowing for consumption has on inflation and the balance of 
payments. 
 
 A budget deficit, whether it is caused by spending on consumption or investment, 
increases demand and, depending on the state of the economy, tends to raise to a 
different extent prices, as well as output. Let us consider the case of an inflation-
fearing government, which wishes to minimize the inflationary effect of its budget 
deficit. It will then borrow from the public rather than its central bank. The rate of 
interest on domestic currency (i.e., the cost of borrowing) depends on the rate of 
domestic inflation and, especially, the expectations regarding its future course. This is 
because the rate of interest normally moves in tandem with the rate of inflation.  
 
The nature of the budget deficit and composition of government expenditure is again 
of relevance here, as it affects the expectations regarding future inflation. Government 
spending on investment tends to lower the future rate of inflation, since higher 
productive capacity enables the production of a greater output. In contrast, 
government spending on consumption does not result in greater future output and 
tends to raise the future inflation rate. Given that the interest rate follows closely 
movements in the rate of inflation, the effect on the cost of borrowing is on account of 
this definitely in an upward direction. Moreover, this effect may be quite pronounced 
for an additional reason: Any expected rise in the future interest rates, implies a fall in 
bond prices and, therefore, an expected capital loss and this needs to be compensated 
by a sufficiently higher return on lending (i.e., interest rate or cost of borrowing). 
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Consequently, an expectation of a rise in the rate of inflation can lead to a much more 
rapid rise in the cost of borrowing.  
 
A related issue, following from the one above, concerns the economy’s 
competitiveness, which is reflected in the balance of payments and the export surplus. 
A rise in the rate of inflation reduces the degree of competitiveness and the export 
surplus and leads to a fall in the exchange rate of the national currency relative to 
other currencies. As a result of the worsening in the terms of trade, the country 
become poorer and needs to make a greater productive effort to be able to pay for a 
given volume of imports. But loss of competitiveness and deteriorating terms of trade 
also affect the ability to borrow in foreign currency. This is because repayment of  
foreign currency loans requires the use of more productive resources and becomes 
more onerous. As a result, the risk of default and the cost of borrowing tend to 
increase, making competitiveness a significant factor in the determination of limits to 
borrowing in foreign currency.  
 
 Moreover, the currency’s weakness reduces its attractiveness for inward capital flows 
and encourages capital outflows. This again tends to raise not only the cost of 
borrowing in foreign currency but also domestic interest rates. The latter can be 
countered by a decisive move on the part of the central bank to increase the supply of 
money. The risk then is that the rate of inflation will accelerate and there will be an 
inflation-devaluation spiral, with damaging effects on economic efficiency and social 
cohesion. 
 
A third factor in determining the borrowing potential in foreign currency is the 
demographic structure of an economy and the likely future demographic 
developments. A non-growing labor force and an ageing population reduce the 
economy’s growth potential and, at the same time, increase the proportion of GDP 
required in order to provide for the non-working elderly. In contrast, a young 
population and a growing labor force improve the economy’s growth prospects and 
reduce the weight of necessary consumption for the sustenance of the elderly.  
Consequently, the risk of default and cost of borrowing is, ceteris paribus, higher for 
an ageing than for a young economy. 
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A fourth factor is the economy’s endowment, in terms of natural resources and 
environment, as well as historical and cultural heritage. Clearly, the existence of oil 
and gas or valuable minerals is favorable to a country’s economic performance and 
growth prospects. Similarly, a temperate and dry climate, beautiful and wide-ranging 
scenery, clean sea and sand beaches, are all advantages for the development of 
tourism and can provide an important stream of income and, especially, foreign 
exchange earnings. Also, archaeological and more recent architectural and other 
monuments, together with an interesting and hospitable culture are equally important 
assets for the development of tourism.  
 
A fifth factor is the institutional framework relating to public administration and its 
interaction with civil society. This includes the operation of a wide range of 
institutional arrangements in the areas of justice, law enforcement, government 
bureaucracy, trade unionism and political activity, which determine the quality of a 
country’s governance. These institutions’ functioning is also responsible for the 
degree of corruption characterizing an economy. It is evident that the quality of 
governance affects economic performance and it is especially important in the 
economy’s attractiveness to foreign investment. Consequently, a country with a good 
institutional setting and governance can be expected to have, ceteris paribus, a lower 
risk of default and cost of borrowing than one with worse institutions and governance. 
 
The variety of factors, which are involved in determining the limits to government 
borrowing, together with the uncertainty concerning their relative weight, renders 
quite unreliable any simple rule or formula as a guide to policy. Even the 
consideration of the seemingly most important factor, which is the debt to GDP ratio, 
is a poor indicator of the limits to borrowing. For example, there are instances of 
countries reaching the limits and going bankrupt with debt being 20% of GDP while a 
country like Japan, which borrows mostly in domestic currency, can sustain debt 
exceeding 200% of GDP. Consequently, simple rules, which stipulate that the limits 
are reached when the servicing of debt exceeds 50% or debt exceeds 300% of the 
budget revenue should be seen as rough counsels for (possibly excessive) prudence 
rather than as theory-derived or evidence-based reliable and accurate propositions. 
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Nevertheless, simple rules regarding the limits to borrowing or even prudence in 
borrowing, such as the European currency union rules that debt should not exceed 
60% and budget deficits 3% respectively of GDP,16 are not without consequences. To 
the extent that they are widely accepted and influential in shaping public opinion and 
the mindset of investors and lenders, they can become self-fulfilling. Since the risk of 
default is largely a matter of the lenders’ opinion and the psychological climate of the 
financial markets, conventional beliefs can often become compelling and crucially 
important even if their scientific validity is doubtful. 
 
A simple proposition, which purports to be a scientific one and as such has gained a 
lot of publicity, is that when the debt to GDP ratio exceeds 90%, the growth rate tends 
to fall.17 More specifically, a statistical analysis of 44 countries spanning about 200 
years and incorporating over 3,700 annual observations, shows that the median 
growth rates for countries with public debt over 90% of GDP are about one percent 
lower than they are at more modest debt levels, while average (mean) growth rates are 
even lower. A second result is that growth declines by about 2 percentage points when 
sovereign and private debt held by foreigners reaches 60% of GDP and falls to half its 
rate when such debt reaches 90% of GDP. 
 
 This analysis has been criticized because it does not distinguish between debt payable 
in a foreign currency from that payable in domestic currency, regarding which the 
inevitability of default is eliminated, since domestic currency is fully controlled by the 
government and can be produced at will to meet any debt obligations. It has also been 
                                                
16 The 60% debt to GDP rule is not based on any serious argument and seems to be quite arbitrary. The 
3% budget deficit to GDP rule seems to be premised on the notion that budgets, especially their main 
consumption component, should be balanced over time while productive public investment is not likely 
to fall short of 3% of GDP. 
17 See, Reinhart Carmen M. and Rogoff  Kenneth S.(2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly, Princeton University Press  and, particularly, Reinhart Carmen M. and Rogoff 
Kenneth S.(2010) “Growth in a Time of Debt”, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 
100, May, pp. 573-578. For a critical review, see Nersisyan Yeva and Wray L. Randall(2010) Does 
Excessive Sovereign Debt Really Hurt Growth? Working Paper No. 603, Levy Economics Institute, 
June; see also Shiller Robert J.(2011) Debt and Delusion, Project Syndicate, 21 July. It should be 
mentioned that the Reinhart & Rogoff study makes some technical mistakes, such as a coding error, 
some data omissions and certain inappropriate aggregation procedures. If these are corrected, the 
association between high debt and low growth is considerably weakened (see, Herndon Thomas, M. 
Ash and R. Pollin (2013), “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique 
of Reinhart and Rogoff”, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst, Working Paper Series, No.322, April. See also, Wolf Martin (2013), “Austerity Loses an 
Article of Faith”, Financial Times, April 24. 
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criticized for reversing causality, since debt-to-GDP ratios tend to increase for 
countries experiencing economic difficulties and weak growth. A third criticism 
concerns the robustness of the statistical relationship, which groups debt-to-GDP 
ratios into four seemingly arbitrary categories (under 30%, 30-60%, 60-90%, and over 
90%) with the last category containing few observations, and the relationship to 
average (mean) growth rates being sensitive to extreme values and not varying 
monotonically. Finally, given the statistical nature and numerous exceptions to the 
above proposition, it is impossible to know its validity in any particular case. 
Consequently, not only it cannot be a substitute for a detailed analysis of the specific 
characteristics of each case but, what is worse, it may be also a misleading guide to 
policy-making. 
 
In conclusion, the limits to government borrowing are not easily discernible. There is 
an important difference in the borrowing limits between foreign and domestic 
currency. The limits to borrowing in foreign currency are set by the lenders’ feeling of 
increasing default risk, which is influenced by a variety of factors, including the 
current psychological climate in the financial markets. In the case of borrowing in 
domestic currency, the limits are determined by the likely consequences of expanding 
debt on the balance between the private and public sectors, as well as the economy’s 
growth prospects. Increasing government borrowing and debt, which widen the 
government’s control over the economy, eventually result (even inevitably, once full 
employment is reached) in accelerating inflation, a destructive inflation-devaluation 
spiral, inefficient use of resources and declining growth.18 Consequently, the limits to 
borrowing in domestic currency are ultimately set by the extent to which the society is 
willing to tolerate the government’s widening control over resources, with all that this 
is likely to entail. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 It is in order to guard against government spending spinning out of control and resulting in 
«anarchistic chaos and inefficiency», that Paul Samuelson finds socially useful the belief in the 
«superstition» that budgets must be balanced. See, Blaug M.(1995)The movie «John Maynard Keynes: 
Life/Ideas/Legacy», cited in Nersisyan Yeva and Wray L. Randall, op.cit.. 
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3.4   Sustainability of consumption out of profits 
 
There are obvious limits to consumption out of profits, which are reached when there 
is no saving out of profits and the totality of profits is spent on consumption goods. It 
may be argued that this is not the absolute limit, since spending by the rentier class 
may be carried further if it liquidates its wealth. Nevertheless, selling of wealth assets 
has narrow bounds, as their value will tend to shrink rapidly with successive sell-offs, 
unless there is buying from a foreign rentier class. 
 
In any case, long before such formal limits are reached, the sustainability of this 
source of profits is likely to have come under threat. This is because the inequality in 
the standard of living between the rentier and the working class will widen as 
consumption out of profits increases. An increasing consumption out of profits 
implies that an increasing amount (and possibly proportion) of productive resources 
will be devoted to the production of luxury and other goods meant for the 
consumption of the rentier class. As long as there is spare productive capacity and the 
extra demand from the rentier class reduces unemployment, the sustainability of this 
source is probably not endangered. But once full employment is reached, it is 
inevitable that social tensions will arise, as the proportion of productive resources 
used for the consumption of the rentier class definitely rises. Further increases in the 
propensity to consume out of profits will then necessarily squeeze workers’ 
consumption. Consequently, further increases in the consumption out of profits is 
certain to cause inflationary pressures and a deterioration in the average standard of 
living of the working class.  
 
It may be argued that the above result may not materialize if productive resources are 
switched from the production of investment goods to that of consumption goods. But 
this may provide only a temporary respite to the squeeze in the consumption 
commanded by wages. The inevitable reduction in the workers’ consumption cannot 
be avoided for long and it will be more pronounced when it finally comes. The 
reduction finally will be more severe because the switch of productive resources from 
investment to consumption, which succeeds in delaying it, also results in a lower 
future productive capacity. Thus, with a lower productive capacity, a given increase in 
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consumption out of profits will eventually squeeze even harder workers’ 
consumption. 
 
There is, nevertheless, a deeper reason why the sustainability of this source of profits 
is unlikely to reach its limits. The social legitimation of the capitalist system rests on 
its effectiveness in increasing a society’s productive capacity. Profit-making is the 
motive force at the heart of the system and the realization of profits is central to its 
operation. Hence, the social legitimacy of profits is inseparable from that of 
capitalism. Can this legitimacy be preserved when profits do not arise from growth in 
productive capacity but from increases in capitalist consumption at the expense of 
workers’ consumption?   
 
A capitalist system, which does not expand productive capacity and in which profits 
are sustained solely by increasing capitalist consumption, is difficult to legitimize. 
Being essentially parasitical, it invites social unrest and polarization. Without social 
legitimacy, it is not likely to survive for long as a democracy and, if it cannot 
overcome its exclusive dependence on this source of profits, it will tend towards a 
dictatorial regime of a left-wing or right-wing variety. Though the latter variety may 
allow the further continuation of this source of profits, this will only be possible in  
extremely repressive conditions under a most oppressive regime. In any case, the 
operative limits of profits’ sustainability stemming from consumption out of profits 
are probably determined by political factors before any ultimate financial or other 
constraints to capitalist consumption come into effect. 
 
 
 
3.5   Sustainability of reducing saving and dis-saving out of wages  
 
Saving out of wages decreases profits and, therefore, reduced saving should increase 
profits. Saving out of wages is normally a small amount and its reduction cannot go 
far before saving becomes zero. Nevertheless, there can be dis-saving or negative 
saving when wage-earners’ consumption exceeds their wages. 
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Dis-saving or negative saving is possible through liquidation of assets or by way of 
borrowing. Wage earners’ assets are quite limited, with the most important being 
home ownership.  Borrowing ability is also quite limited, with home ownership again 
providing the foremost collateral. Consequently, it would appear that the limits not 
only to reducing but also to negative saving are quite narrow. Moreover, in the case of 
negative saving via borrowing, the repayment of the loan will necessitate future 
saving and hence reduced future profits. 
 
In view of the above, it may be thought that this source of profits and its sustainability 
are of little importance. Nevertheless, recent events have belied this belief. The 
banking crisis of 2007-8 in the US and its continued manifestation in Europe today 
(2013), originate in reduced saving out of wages and even dis-saving (especially in 
the US) for nearly a decade preceding the crisis. This was based on a number of 
developments (the story of which cannot be recounted here), which made possible 
borrowing on an extensive scale for wage-earners. The most important of these in our 
context, was the long and substantial rise of house prices in conjunction with the 
banks’ enhanced readiness in providing mortgages and consumer loans. When the 
bubble in house prices finally burst, the collapse of the housing market and the 
banking crisis inevitably ensued.  
 
What this episode demonstrates is that, under the appropriate circumstances, the 
source of profits premised on dis-saving out of wages can play an important role in 
supporting for a considerable period the level of profits. Of course, it also 
demonstrates vividly the dangers of this manner of profits’ support and how difficult 
it is to replace it with other profits’ sources. This is especially the case, when the 
growth of consumption out of wages has masked and made largely irrelevant the 
growth in income inequality (particularly in the US).19 The reversing in the trend of 
growing income inequality, through measures which improve labor productivity (such 
as better education and training, as well as labor market reforms), may be the best 
way today to support the volume of profits. Such a reversal will make possible an 
increase in consumption out of wages, thus strengthening aggregate demand and 
                                                
19 See, Rajan Raghuram (2010) “How Inequality Fueled the Crisis”, Project Syndicate, July; also, 
Dadush Uri, Kemal Darvis, Sarah P. Milsom and Bennett Stancil (2012)  Inequality in America: Facts, 
Trends, and International Perspectives, Brookings Institution Press. 
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encouraging investment. To the extent that investment is positively affected, the level 
of profits will be lifted.20  
 
4 Monetary policy and profits 
 
Unlike fiscal policy, which directly affects profits, monetary policy can have only an 
indirect effect. Monetary policy, carried out by the central bank, directly determines 
the key interest rate and the quantity of high-powered or base money (i.e., total 
currency in circulation or in banks’ vaults plus commercial banks’ reserves with the 
central bank). Through these and the determination of reserve requirements and 
operating regulations for commercial banks, as well as the use of open market 
operations to set the yield on an array of Treasury bonds (and more unconventionally 
even other bonds), the central bank can influence the whole structure of interest rates 
and the full range of assets that, with varying degrees of liquidity, may serve as 
money. It is then on the basis of these that monetary policy may be able to affect 
profits.  
 
Let us consider how monetary policy may affect the various sources of profits, 
starting with investment. Monetary policy can encourage investment by lowering 
interest rates. A lower rate of interest increases the present value of an investment 
project and facilitates its financing, thus making it more attractive.  
 
Monetary policy’s ability to lower interest rates affects similarly most of the other 
sources of profits. A budget deficit becomes cheaper to finance when interest rates fall 
and, therefore, it tends to be encouraged. Spending out of profits and dis-saving out of 
wages are also encouraged, since the return to saving is reduced. The propensity to 
save out of all types of income tends to fall and, correspondingly, the propensity to 
consume tends to rise. The increase in consumption is likely to be less marked, if not 
insignificant, for profits recipients than for wage earners for two reasons. First, profits 
recipients have a much lower propensity to consume and their saving habits probably 
have a negligible sensitivity (i.e., are relatively inelastic) to changes in interest rates. 
                                                
20 A reversal of the income inequality trend through taxation, though seemingly more straightforward, 
may be problematic if investment is affected adversely by the income-equalizing taxes. 
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Second, profits recipients are likely to be owners of bonds and, therefore, they are 
also interest recipients. Consequently, lower interest rates reduce their income and 
this will tend to reduce their consumption. Nevertheless, this negative income effect is 
also likely to be negligible and capitalist consumption out of both profits and interest 
will be most probably largely unaffected by interest rate changes. 
The final source of profits, which is the export surplus, is also affected positively by 
lower interest rates. This is because lower interest rates will lead to a lower exchange 
rate. To start with, the increased consumption will tend to affect adversely the balance 
of payments, the more so the greater the proportion of imports in consumption. As a 
result, the exchange rate is likely to be lowered, not only because of the increased 
imports of the consumption goods but also because capital inflows in search of an 
attractive interest return will be reduced. A lower exchange rate discourages imports, 
since they become more expensive in terms of the local currency, and encourages 
exports, which become cheaper in terms of foreign currencies. Consequently, the 
export surplus will tend to increase. 
 
This result does not hold when exchange rates are fixed. In the case of a fixed 
exchange rate of the local currency relative to the currencies of the foreign trading 
partners, the increased consumption arising out of lower interest rates leads 
unambiguously to increased imports of consumption goods and a fall in the export 
surplus. Consequently, in this case, profits are lower rather than higher. 
 
The above case is of relevance not only to fixed exchange rates arrangements among 
states that retain the right to a national monetary policy, such as the European 
experiments that preceded the introduction of the euro, but also for the present-day 
Eurozone. In the Eurozone, of course, monetary policy is the responsibility 
exclusively of the European Central Bank (ECB). When the ECB lowers interest 
rates, it considers the effects of this policy on the Eurozone as a whole rather than on 
each individual member country separately. From this viewpoint, the weakening of 
the euro’s exchange rate can be expected to increase profits in the Eurozone as a 
whole. But this impact may be distributed in a markedly different fashion among the 
individual member countries and depends largely on the extent to which their trade is 
concentrated within the Eurozone. This becomes quite evident in the extreme case of 
a country that, let us suppose, does no trading at all with countries outside the 
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Eurozone. In that case, the fall in the euro’s exchange rate resulting from a lowering 
of the interest rate will be of little significance to its actual terms of trade. It will be 
effectively in the position of a country with fixed exchange rates in relation to its 
actual trading partners, in which a lowering of the interest rates implies higher 
consumption and imports and, consequently, a lower export surplus and volume of 
profits. 
 
It may be concluded that, with the exception of fixed exchange rates or when terms of 
trade are not affected, lowering of interest rates by monetary policy generally results 
in a boost to profits. There are, nevertheless, limits to the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in boosting profits.21 These limits are reached when interest rates are very low 
and the central bank’s base rate approaches zero. It is then difficult for monetary 
policy to further boost profits.  
 
It would seem that once the base rate has reached zero, the only way that monetary 
policy can continue to have an effect is by pushing the interest rate below zero. This is 
quite possible for the real interest rate, i.e. the interest rate minus the rate of price 
inflation, and implies an inflation-aiming monetary policy that goes against the grain 
of central banking orthodoxy. Equally, if not even more, unorthodox is the alternative 
possibility of imposing a cost on the holding of money. Such a suggestion was made 
about one century ago by Silvio Gessel, a would-be reformer of the capitalist system 
who was influenced by Henry George and wished to abolish the privileges attaching 
to the non-productive, passive ownership of land and money. It is noteworthy, that 
J.M. Keynes commented favorably on Gessel’s scheme of “stamped” money, finding 
it only impracticable because it would lead to substitution of currency by other less 
liquid assets, such as bank deposits, debts at call, foreign money, jewelry and precious 
metals.  
 
                                                
21  The limits are usually associated in textbooks with Keynes’ liquidity trap, when the holders of 
Treasury bonds are willing to offer all the bonds in their possession at a price implying a low but still 
positive yield. At that price, their supply (or equivalently the demand for money) becomes perfectly 
elastic and monetary policy has no traction. According to Krugman, “essentially the whole advanced 
world, accounting for 70% of world GDP at market prices, is in a liquidity trap”; see Krugman Paul 
(2010),“How Much of the World is. in a Liquidity Trap?”, The New York Times, March 17. 
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Though major central banks (US, EU and Japan) keep base rates well below 1%, they 
do not seem prepared at present to use such unconventional practices22 but engage in 
measures, such as quantitative easing, which increase liquidity. Money has never been 
so cheap yet investment is weak, as US listed firms alone sit on reserves of 1.8 trillion 
dollars.23 As a result, monetary policy seems to be ineffective in amplifying the 
sources of profits and actually attaining higher profits. 
 
The main effect of cheap money seems to be rising asset prices. Stock market and real 
estate prices are on the rise and, it might be argued, this is part of the mechanism 
through which monetary policy achieves its intended effects.24 But there may be a 
disjunction between the assets markets, in which bubbles may be forming, and the 
products markets which remain weak. The distinction drawn by Keynes between 
“financial circulation” and “industrial circulation” may well be apposite.25 Liquidity 
and indeed productive resources may be drawn into the financial sphere for 
considerable time and create bubbles in asset prices, which burst before any beneficial 
effect is transmitted to the industrial sphere. As a result and contrary to the established 
theory, the bursting of the asset prices bubble finally has a damaging rather than a 
beneficial effect on the industrial sphere. 
 
 Under what conditions can such an eventuality arise? What is required is an initial 
impetus in asset prices and the view by a sufficient mass of market participants that 
the particular assets have a potential for capital gains exceeding the prospective 
profits in the production of goods and services. The historically not uncommon 
recurrence of bubbles not only in financial and other assets but even in products, such 
as tulips in 17th century Holland, shows that the required conditions are far from 
inconceivable. 
 
                                                
22  There are, nevertheless, indications that the Bank of Japan, after more than twenty years of 
devotional focus on the fear of inflation and resistance to pursuing an expansionary policy in a 
determined fashion, today seriously contemplates measures aiming at a 2% rate of inflation.  
23  See, The Economist (2013), “A World of Cheap Money”, April 6.  
24  This is the established position; see, for example, Mishkin Frederic S. (2001), “The Transmission 
Mechanism and the Role of Asset Prices in Monetary Policy”, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper 8617, December. 
25  See, Keynes J.M. (1930), A Treatise on Money, reprinted in Keynes J.M. Collected Writings, Vol.6, 
Cambridge University Press, pp.217-218. 
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In conclusion, monetary policy can affect positively the sources of profits through 
lowering interest rates but only within certain bounds. Once interest rates approach 
zero or a liquidity trap is reached, monetary policy becomes impotent. Increases in 
liquidity (not only when these boundaries are reached but even before), can be 
destructive as well as beneficial to profits and production. Keynes’ distinction 
between “financial circulation” and “industrial circulation” has long been ignored by 
orthodox economic theory and needs to be revisited and seriously studied, as it may 
prove to be the key to a better understanding of monetary policy’s effects and 
potential.26  
 
 
5.  Concluding comments 
 
In this concluding section, the primary impacts, pathology and negative side effects, 
as well as the sustainability limits of the different profits’ sources are briefly 
reviewed. In addition, a terminology that can aptly distinguish the sources among 
themselves, as well as from the pathological instances with which they are 
associated,27 is proposed for evocative aid. Finally, in the context of the suggested 
terminology, mention is made of a neglected term proposed nearly a century ago, 
which brings out the relationship between profits and employment.  
 
The name proposed for the profits generated by the investment source of profits is 
organic profits. The primary association of organic profits is with the economy’s 
productive capacity. This is expanded by the investment, which has given rise to 
organic profits, according to the estimations of the investing firms regarding the 
prospects for future profits in different economic activities. These estimations are 
                                                
26  It is worth noting that a similar distinction was also made by Joseph Schumpeter, who distinguished  
“capital markets” in stocks, bonds, mortgages, real estate and land from “circulating capital” for the 
needs of production. This point is made in an excellent paper, which is mindful of the importance of 
such a distinction and shows the way forward in this area, by Bezemer Dirk J. (2012), “Finance and 
Growth: When Credit Helps and When it Hinders”, Invited presentation at the Institute for New 
Economic Thinking Plenary Conference, April 2012, Berlin.  
 
 
27  The pathological form takes hold when the limits, which may not always be precisely identifiable, 
are eventually reached. Its appearance may then become suddenly rather than gradually evident to the 
perception of the relevant market participants and policymakers.  
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influenced by a host of factors, such as the climate of business confidence, the ease of 
financing conditions and the interpretation of market-prices signaling, including the 
present volume of total profits and its distribution among different sectors. The 
estimations of the investing firms may turn out wrong, so that excessive investment is 
made in certain activities. This may prove disastrous for the firms concerned but the 
necessary adjustment of resource reallocation among firms and sectors does not 
ordinarily pose a problem to the operation of the economy. If, nevertheless, the 
excessive investment results in a grave sectorial imbalance, especially in strategic 
sectors with a large number of linkages throughout the economy (e.g. banking), then 
the collateral damage can be extensive and the necessary adjustment becomes 
impossible without a serious disruption to the operation of the economy. A grave 
sectorial imbalance sets then the limits of the investment source of profits, generating 
widespread losses throughout the economy. These limits give rise to the pathological 
form of organic profits, which may be termed miscarried profits. 
 
The profits emerging from the export surplus source might be named non-autonomous 
profits. These are primarily associated with the acquisition of foreign assets but also 
with a reduction in foreign profits of an equal magnitude. The limits of non-
autonomous profits are determined by the extent to which the foreign trading partners 
are willing to tolerate this practice, which in effect amounts to a kind of poaching of 
their own profits. Once their toleration is exhausted, they can resort to tariffs on 
imports and/or lowering of the exchange rate. These measures can eliminate the non-
autonomous profits, turning them to their pathological form, which is of two kinds. 
The reversal of their balance of trade from negative to positive through tariffs and/or 
the exchange rate leads to what may be termed thwarted profits, while the lower value 
of foreign assets in terms of the local currency might be called devalued profits. 
 
The name proposed for the profits issuing from the budget deficit is provisioned 
profits. These are primarily associated with an increase in public debt. The limits of 
provisioned profits are determined by the creditors’ confidence that the debt will be 
fully honored. Clearly, this greatly depends on whether the debt is incurred in the 
local currency, which is under the control of the borrowing country, or whether it is in 
foreign currency. But it also depends on whether the debt is utilized to strengthen the 
productive potential or made use of to increase consumption. This is of importance 
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even if the debt is in local currency. A consumption-oriented, or generally wasteful 
use of the debt, which does not enhance the productive capacity, tends to create 
inflationary pressures and to lower the exchange rate of the local currency. As a 
result, even the certain repayment of a local currency debt will impose a loss on both 
the home and foreign creditors, since it will represent a lower value in purchasing 
power or real terms (a loss that is particularly relevant for the home creditors) and a 
lower value in terms of foreign currency (more important for the foreign 
creditors).28Consequently, the creditors’ confidence wanes and the limits of 
provisioned profits are reached when the mounting debt is increasingly channeled to 
wasteful or other uses that do not promote the productive potential, at which point 
they assume in creditors’ perception the pathological form of squandered profits. 
 
The profits generated by increased consumption out of profits, may be termed 
embellishing profits. They are largely associated with a larger production and 
consumption of luxury goods. The approach to the limits of this source is shown by 
the appearance of inflationary pressures and increasing inequality in living standards, 
as the economy gets near full employment. But the limits are definitely arrived at, 
when the social legitimacy of a democratic capitalist system is widely questioned and 
put in jeopardy. This source can then be retained only by a passage to a non-
democratic oppressive regime. The pathological form of profits, which will have 
taken hold by then, may be termed dissolute profits. 
 
The source of profits associated with lower saving and indeed dis-saving out of 
wages, gives rise to profits which may be labeled gratifying profits. These profits are 
connected with a greater consumption of goods and services and, hence, a higher 
living standard of wage-earners. The limits of gratifying profits are normally narrow 
and cannot extend beyond the point where all wages are consumed and there is no 
saving out of wages. Nevertheless, the boundaries may be extended considerably if 
the banking system’s laxity increases and lending terms are loosened. In this case, the 
limits are arrived at, when the default rate in wage-earners’ loans increases and the 
                                                
28  The main difference between home and foreign creditors seems to be that the latter can stop lending 
and thus may extricate themselves  while the former, even if they refuse to lend, will still carry the debt 
burden as taxpayers, if the government controls the central bank and borrows from it.  
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loans are perceived to have become unsustainable. The pathological form, which then  
comes into evidence, may be called dissipated profits.  
 
The comments above are presented in the form of a table (see Table 1); in which, I 
stands for investment, X-M for export surplus, B for budget deficit, CΠ for 
consumption out of profits and, finally, -SW for less saving out of wages. The 
beneficial phase profits are transformed into the pathological phase ones, as the limits 
of the beneficial phase are approached. Though the transformation may be gradual, its 
widespread realization by the public of the pathological nature of profits is likely to 
take place suddenly. This is to be expected, since if the on-going transformation were 
widely realized, normally there would be pressures to arrest the increasing use of the 
particular profits’ source. Nevertheless, the possibility that the forces insisting on the 
continued use of the hazardous source are strong enough to prevail, should not be 
dismissed. Most crises result from profits reaching their pathological phase because 
the power structure in a society is stacked in favor of particular business interests or 
populist political forces. 
 
After this short review of the main impacts, limits and pathological forms of the five 
sources of profits, and following the proposed terminology, the concluding section 
ends with a brief consideration of a final concept. This is wasted profits, first 
introduced by Jerome Levy.29  
 
Levy believed that profits, being crucially important to the operation of the capitalist 
economy, should not be wasted but made the most of, so as to provide the highest 
possible level of employment and output. Profits are wasted, whenever they are 
greater than what is absolutely necessary for any given level of employment and 
output. The volume of profits that is absolutely necessary for a level of employment is 
determined by the risks (market and any other) inherent in each line of production. 
The estimation of wasted profits, therefore, requires knowledge of the risks attendant 
                                                
29  Jerome Levy was an American businessman and later financier, who independently investigated the 
sources of profits from an empirical rather than a theoretical standpoint and in a more disaggregated 
detail than Kalecki (allegedly before Kalecki, though his conclusions were published later in 1943). 
The Levy Economics Institute at Bard College was founded and financed by him and his descendants. 
See, Levy S. Jay (2001), “Profits: The Views of Jerome Levy and Michal Kalecki”, Journal of Post-
Keynesian Economics, Vol.24, Issue 1, pp.17-30. 
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on the particular economic activity, in order to establish the volume of profits which 
are absolutely necessary. 
 
It is clear that Levy’s concept of wasted profits is not easy to estimate and this is 
perhaps a reason it did not catch on. A general inference that may, nevertheless, be 
drawn from it concerns the intrinsic wasted profits associated with monopolies. 
Consequently, its usefulness is to be found not so much in its operational value as to 
the attention it directs to the wasted profits and loss of employment, which are 
unfailingly involved in monopolies. 
 
The concept of wasted profits might yet be reinterpreted in a Kaleckian fashion, so as 
to be made more operational. Wasted profits, in this case, will not be measured as 
such but will be measurable in terms of the loss in employment which they cause.  
Given the volume of profits determined by the five sources, the level of employment 
is determined by the degree of monopoly. The latter can be simply indicated by the 
profit margin per unit of employment. Wasted profits can then be defined as the loss 
in employment associated with a given increase in the degree of monopoly or profit 
margin. In this manner, wasted profits are expressed in terms of their effect on 
employment and measured in labor units.  
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 Table 1: Sustainability limits of profits’ sources and related  terminology 
 
 
 
Profits’ 
Sources 
Beneficial 
phase    
Primary 
impacts 
Limits Pathological 
phase 
I organic profits Increase in 
productive 
capacity. 
Excessive 
sectorial 
imbalance. 
miscarried 
profits 
X-M non-autonomous 
profits 
Increase in the 
ownership of 
foreign assets. 
Decrease pro 
tanto in the profits 
of trading 
partners.  
Waning 
toleration of 
trading 
partners to 
decreases in 
their profits. 
thwarted 
profits 
B provisioned 
profits 
Increase in public 
debt and the 
sovereign 
debt/GDP ratio. 
Increase in public 
infrastructure, 
transfers and 
social services 
(health,education, 
police, army etc.). 
Faltering 
creditors’ 
confidence.   
squandered 
profits 
CΠ embellishing 
profits 
Increase in the 
consumption of 
luxury goods and 
services. 
Crumbling 
social 
legitimacy. 
dissolute 
profits 
-SW gratifying 
profits 
Increase in mass 
consumption and 
the general living 
standard. 
Increase in the 
debt/income and 
debt/assets ratios. 
Mounting debt 
leverage 
vulnerability. 
dissipated 
profits 
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